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The quantum capacity of a quantum channel is always smaller than the capacity of the channel
for private communication. However, both quantities are given by the infinite regularization of
respectively the coherent and the private information. Here, we construct a family of channels for
which the private and coherent information can remain strictly superadditive for unbounded number
of uses. We prove this by showing that the coherent information is strictly larger than the private
information of a smaller number of uses of the channel. This implies that even though the quantum
capacity is upper bounded by the private capacity, the non-regularized quantities can be interleaved.
From an operational point of view, the private capacity can be used for gauging the practical value
of quantum channels for secure communication and, consequently, for key distribution. We thus
show that in order to evaluate the interest a channel for this task it is necessary to optimize the
private information over an unlimited number of uses of the channel.
How well is it possible to characterize the resources
available to transmit information? In classical informa-
tion theory, this proves to be fully within our computa-
tional abilities: given a description of a channel, answer-
ing the question about its capacity to convey information
to the receiver is straightforward. However, our world is
inherently quantum and when one turns to the channels
which transmit quantum information – the amount of re-
sources required to compute their capacities is unknown
at best. To compute a number of different types of ca-
pacity of the quantum channel, defined as regularized
quantities [1–3], it is necessary to perform an unbounded
optimization over the number of the copies of the chan-
nel. The action of a channel NA→B can be defined via
an isometry V A→BE : NA→B(ρ) = trEV ρV ∗, and its
complementary channel is NA→Ec (ρ) = trBV ρV ∗. In the
following, we will omit the register superscripts when it
does not add to clarity.
The quantum and classical capacity of a channel are
given by:
Q(N ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
Q(1)(N ), (1)
C(N ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
C(1)(N ) (2)
where
Q(1)(N ) = max
ρA
H(B)−H(E), (3)
C(1)(N ) = max
ρ∈R
I(X;B). (4)
The optimization of the quantum capacity is performed
over all valid states on the input register A while the
optimization of the classical capacity is performed over
R the set of classical-quantum states of the form ρXA =∑
x px|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρAx . Where X is an auxiliary classical
register, H is the von Neumann entropy and I(X;B) is
the quantum mutual information.
From the above expressions it follows that one has to
optimize over an infinite number of copies of the channel
in order to compute its capacity. Do we have to resort
to the regularized expression in order to compute the
capacity of a quantum channel? It has recently been
shown that at least in the case of the quantum capacity
this is unavoidable [4, 5] even when we attempt to answer
the question of whether the channel has any capacity at
all [6]. For the classical capacity, which is known to be
superadditive for two uses of the channel [7], there is
some evidence that ultimately the regularization might
not be required [8, 9].
Arguably, the biggest practical success of quantum in-
formation theory to date is the possibility of quantum
key distribution (QKD). QKD allows two distant parties
to agree on a secret key independent of any eavesdrop-
per. The required assumptions are: access to a quantum
channel with positive private capacity and the validity
of quantum physics [10]. On the other hand, key distri-
bution is a primitive that can only be implemented with
classical resources if one is willing to constrain the power
of the eavesdropper. Even though there exist practical
QKD schemes which enable secure communication over
large distances with high key rates [11–14], some of the
fundamental questions about the capacity to transmit se-
cure correlations remain unanswered.
There are essentially two quantities which describe the
ability of the channel to send secure messages to the re-
ceiver. The first one, is called private capacity P. It
has a clear operational interpretation as the maximum
rate at which the sender, Alice, can send private classi-
cal communication to the receiver, Bob. It is defined as
follows:
P(N ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
P(1)(N⊗n). (5)
That is the private capacity is given by the regularization
of P(1)(N ), the private information of the channel, which
is given by
P(1)(N ) = max
ρ∈R
I(X;B)− I(X;E). (6)
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2One can view private capacity as the optimal rate of reli-
able communication keeping Eve in a product state with
Alice and Bob.
This capacity characterizes the optimal rates of QKD.
A better understanding of this quantity would allow to
evaluate precisely the usefulness of communications chan-
nels for practical QKD links. For instance, the private
capacity of Gaussian channels [15] remains open. Be-
yond the pure loss channel [16] only lower bounds on the
private information of a single use are known.
In the case of private capacity, the eavesdropper, Eve,
is given a purification of the channel output which means
that she is as powerful as it is allowed by quantum me-
chanics. However, this setting may be too restrictive for
practical applications given the current state of the art
in quantum information processing. A natural relaxation
of this strong security requirement is to assume that Eve
obtains information about the key by performing a mea-
surement on her state. This security requirement is re-
flected in the second quantity, locking capacity L. By
L we denote all the recently introduced locking capaci-
ties [17] of a quantum channel. They are defined by the
optimal rate of reliable classical communication requir-
ing Eve to have vanishing accessible information about
the message. This difference in the security criterion has
striking consequences. For instance it implies that some
channels that have no private capacity have close to max-
imum locking capacity [18] and for some relevant classes
of channels locked communications can be performed at
almost the classical capacity rate [19]. The following up-
per bound is known for the locking capacities:
L(N ) ≤ Lu(N ) = sup
n
1
n
L(1)u (N⊗n) (7)
where L(1)u , that we will call the locking information, is
given by:
L(1)u (N ) = max
ρ∈R
I(X;B)− Iacc(X;E). (8)
The accessible information Iacc(X;E) = maxΓ I(X;Y ),
where Γ is the set of all POVMs on E.
Despite the significance of the private and locking in-
formation, we still understand very little about its be-
haviour when the communication channel is used many
times. Authors in [20, 21] provide evidence that P(1)(N )
is superadditive for a small finite number of channel uses,
although the magnitude of this effect is quantitatively
very small. Recently, it has been shown the existence of
two quantum channels N1,N2 with C(N1) ≤ 2,P(N2) =
0 for which P(N1 ⊗ N2) ≥ 1/2 log d, where d is the di-
mension of the output of the joint channel [22]. This
example shows that the private capacity is a superaddi-
tive quantity (this was also proved in [23] using a different
construction).
Even less is known about the locking capacity. It fol-
lows trivially that L(1)u is sandwiched between the classi-
cal information and the private information [17]:
P(1)(N ) ≤ L(1)u (N ) ≤ C(1)(N ). (9)
Here we show that private information can be strictly
superadditive for an arbitrarily large number of uses of
the channel. More precisely, we prove the following the-
orem:
Theorem 1. For any n there exists a quantum channel
Nn such that for n > k ≥ 1:
1
k
P(1)(N⊗kn ) <
1
k + 1
Q(1)(N⊗k+1n ). (10)
This proves that entangled inputs increase the private
information of a quantum channel and this effect persists
for an arbitrary number of channel uses. As a bonus, we
obtain a qualitatively different proof for the unbounded
superadditivity of the coherent information [6].
We now introduce the key components of our construc-
tion which are required to prove Theorem 1.
Main construction: switch channel. We first in-
troduce switch channels:
N SA→SB(ρSA) =
∑
i
PS→Si ⊗NA→Bi (ρSA). (11)
A switch channel consists of two input registers S and A
of dimensions d and n respectively. Register S is mea-
sured in the standard basis and conditioned on the mea-
surement outcome i a component channel Ni is applied
to the second register. The computation of P(1)(N ) and
L(1)u (N ) when N is of the form (11) can be simplified; it
suffices to restrict inputs to a special form. The equiva-
lent result for the quantum capacity was proved in [24].
Lemma 1. Consider a switch channel N SA→SB and let
T = {ρ : ρ = ∑x px|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |s〉〈s|S ⊗ ρAx }. Then:
1. P(1)(N ) = max1≤s<n P(1)(Ns),
2. L(1)u (N ) = max1≤s<n L(1)u (Ns).
Both P(1)(N ) and L(1)u (N ) can be achieved by some ρ ∈
T .
Proof. The channel complementary to a switch channel is
also a switch channel with component channels {N ci }ni=1
complementary to {Ni}ni=1 [6]. We denote the output
systems of the complementary channel by S and E. Let
ρ ∈ R be the input state that maximizes L(1)u (N ). The
following chain of inequalities holds:
I(X;BS)− Iacc(X;ES) (12)
=
∑
s
ps
(
I(X;B|S = s)− Iacc(X;E|S = s)
)
(13)
≤ max
s
(
I(X;B|S = s)− Iacc(X;E|S = s)
)
(14)
≤ max
s
L(1)u (Ns). (15)
The first equality follows because S is a classical system.
The first inequality follows by choosing the value of s
which maximizes the difference between the mutual and
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FIG. 1. The channel has two input registers the control regis-
ter S and the data register A. The control register is measured
in the computational basis and depending on the output ei-
ther the erasure channel E˜np,d or n copies of the d-dimensional
rocket channel are applied.
the accessible information. The second one since the dif-
ference between the between the mutual information to
the receiver and the accessible information to the envi-
ronment is upper bounded by the locking information of
the channel Ns. This upper bound is achievable by an
input state of the form σXSA =
∑
x px|x〉〈x|⊗ |s〉〈s|⊗ρx
where trS(σ
XSA) is the state that achieves the locking
information of channel Ns. Finally note that σXSA ∈ T .
The proof for the private capacity is analogous and
follows by replacing Iacc(X;E) with I(X;E). uunionsq
There are two types of channels which we will use in
place of Ni. The first channel is the erasure channel:
EA→Bp,d (ρA) = (1− p)ρB + p|e〉〈e|B (16)
where |e〉〈e| is the erasure flag and d the dimension of
the input register A. For p ≤ 1/2 the erasure chan-
nel is degradable and Q(Ep,d) = P(Ep,d) = max{0, (1 −
2p) log d}, and C(Ep,d) = (1− p) log d.
The locking information of the erasure channel is cur-
rently unknown. We might upper bound it by its classi-
cal capacity but that gives a too loose bound. A slightly
tighter upper bound is obtained in the following lemma
(the proof can be found in the Supplemental material):
Lemma 2. Let p ≤ 1/2, the locking information of Ep,d
is upper-bounded by
L(1)u (Ep,d) ≤ (1− p) log d− pγd log e, (17)
where γd := ln d −
∑d
t=2 t
−1, and limd→∞ γd = γ is the
Euler’s constant.
For any quantum channel N used alongside Ep,d the
classical information is additive:
Lemma 3. For all quantum channels N
C(1)
(
N ⊗ E⊗np,d
)
= C(1)(N ) + nC(1)(Ep,d). (18)
Proof. It is trivial that the left hand side of Eq. 18 is
equal or greater than the right hand side. In order to
prove the converse inequality consider the following chain
of inequalities:
C(1)(N ⊗ E⊗np,d ) = C(1)(M⊗Ep,d) (19)
= max
ρ
I(X;B1B2) (20)
= max
ρ
(1− p)I(X;B1A2) + pI(X;B1) (21)
≤ (1− p)C(1)(M⊗ I) + pC(1)(M) (22)
= C(1)(M) + (1− p) log d (23)
= C(1)(N ) + n(1− p) log d. (24)
The first equality follows by identifying M with N ⊗
E⊗n−1p,d . We let A1, A2 and B1, B2 be the input and out-
put of M and Ep,d respectively. The second equality is
just the definition of the classical information (see Eq.
2). The third equality breaks the mutual information
depending on the erasure channel transmitting or eras-
ing. The inequality follows by maximizing each of the two
mutual informations individually. The fourth inequality
follows by taking into account that the classical infor-
mation of the identity is additive and the last one by
applying the same argument recursively for n− 1 times.
uunionsq
Intuitively, Lemma 3 states that the erasure channel
cannot convey more information than an identity channel
of dimension d1−p even in the presence of other channels.
Furthermore, we can use the classical capacity to obtain a
trivial bound for the locking and private information. It
turns out that this trivial bound is tight and is saturated
by the channel construction that we introduce below.
The second channel that we use alongside Ep,d is a
d-dimensional ‘rocket’ channel, Rd [22]. It consists of
two d-dimensional input registers A1 and A2 and a d-
dimensional output register B. A1 and A2 are first sub-
ject to a random unitary and then jointly decoupled with
a controlled dephasing gate. Then, the contents of A1 be-
comes the output of the channel and the contents of A2 is
traced out. Bob also receives the classical description of
the unitaries which acted on A1 and A2. Since dephasing
occurs after the input registers have been scrambled by
a random unitary, it is very hard for Alice to code for
such channel, hence it has a very low classical capacity:
C(Rd) ≤ 2.
Our switch channel construction has the following
form:
Nn,p,d = P0 ⊗Rnd + P1 ⊗ E˜np,d (25)
That is, it allows Alice to choose between Rnd = R⊗nd and
E˜np,d = Ep,d ⊗ E1,d2n−1 ; a d-dimensional erasure channel
4padded with a full erasure channel to match the input
dimension of Rnd .
Upper bound. To upper bound the private infor-
mation of Nn,p,d we only need to optimize over all the
possible different choices of Rnd and E˜np,d. Thus, the up-
per bound for P(1)(N⊗kn,p,d) for k ≥ 1 reads:
P(1)(N⊗kn,p,d) = max
0≤i≤k
P(1)(E⊗ip,d ⊗ (Rnd )⊗k−i)
≤ max

C(1)((Rnd )⊗k)
max
1≤i≤k−1
C(1)(E⊗ip,d ⊗ (Rnd )⊗k−i),
P(1)(E⊗kp,d )
≤ max

2kn,
(2n+ (k − 1)(1− p) log d) .
(1− 2p) k log d
(26)
Superadditivity of P(1). First, we present the input
state such that for j > i uses and for some range of pa-
rameters allows to conclude that the private information
for j uses is higher than the upper bound (26) for i uses.
This state has the form:
ρ =
j−1⊗
k=1
(
Φ+
A˜kA
[1]
k1
⊗ Φ+
A
[1]
k2A
[k+1]
11
⊗ σA
)
(27)
where Φ+AB = 1/d
∑d
i,j=1 |ii〉〈jj|. Alice chooses the
rocket channel and for the remaining j − 1 uses of the
channel she selects Enp,d. We denote with superscript [k]
the k-th use of the channel and the subscript ij indicates
the input register as pictured in Fig. 1. The state can be
read operationally as follows: Alice keeps the A˜km reg-
isters and sends A
[1]
k1 through the first input of k-th Rd
channel, A
[1]
k2 through the second (which will be subse-
quently discarded by the channel) and A
[k]
11 through Ep,d.
The remaining inputs do not play any role, so Alice can
send any pure state σA through ED,1 and R[k]d for k > j.
It is easy to verify that:
Q(1)(N⊗jn,p,d, ρ) =
(j − 1)(1− p)
j
log d. (28)
This immediately gives a lower bound for the locking
and private information. Now, we are ready to prove
Theorem 1.
Proof. Fix d = 24n
2/(1−2p) and p = 1124 . Then the
regularized upper bounds (26) for P(1) after k uses of
the channel have the form U1k =
2n
k , U
2
k =
2n(13(k−1)n+1)
k
and U3k = 4n
2; the lower bound (28) after k + 1 uses of
the channel has the form Lk+1 =
26kn2
k+1 .
Consider the differences Dik = −U ik + Lk+1 for i =
1, 2, 3. Then, a simple substitution shows that D1k =
26kn2
k+1 − 2nk , D2k = − 2n(k−13n+1)k(k+1) , D3k = 2(11k−2)n
2
k+1 . All of
the differences are positive for n > k ≥ 1. uunionsq
The results of the theorem indicate that in order to
compute the exact private capacity of a channel N it is
necessary to compute P(1)(N⊗n) for an arbitrary num-
ber of uses n. In addition, we found an example whereby
for each n and 1 ≤ k < n having access to one additional
copy of the channel up to n provides the parties with
the largest possible gain in the capacity, proportional to
the output dimension of the channel. Note, that for the
channel Nn,p,d strict superadditivity of both private and
coherent information holds for all number of uses of the
channel up to n. This is markedly different from all previ-
ously known channel constructions which exhibit various
superadditivity effects. Such constructions exhibited su-
peradditivity for some fixed number of uses of the chan-
nel t versus t + c for some c. Our construction above
shows that the private and coherent information of the
same channel can be strictly superadditive for an arbi-
trary number of channel uses.
Superadditivity of L(1)u . Now we study the condi-
tions necessary to obtain a similar result for the locking
information of our channel construction. Some algebra
shows that the upper bound given by Lemma 2 combined
with the lower bound given by (27) do not yield super-
additivity. However, the ensembles used for the upper
bound of I(X;A) and Iacc(X;E) in Lemma 2 are dif-
ferent; in particular for the former we used a discrete
ensemble of orthogonal states, while the latter bound
is obtained via the so called Scrooge ensemble [25], in
consequence for a given ensemble either Alice should ob-
tain less information or Eve more implying that a bound
tighter than that of Lemma 2 should hold. In particular,
if this tighter bound takes the following form:
Conjecture 1. [Sharper upper bound for L(1)u ]
L(1)u (Ep,d) ≤ (1− p) log d− p log d. (29)
where  > 1−pp(n−1) .
The same techniques used in the proof of Theorem 1
would allow to prove superadditivity.
Discussion. In this paper we have constructed a fam-
ily of channels for which the private and coherent infor-
mation can remain strictly superadditive for any number
of uses of the channel. We are able to prove this result
by showing that the private information of k uses of the
channel is smaller than the coherent information of k+ 1
uses. That is, both quantities can be interleaved use after
use for the first n uses of the channel. This shows that
even though the quantum capacity is upper bounded by
the infinite regularization of the private information, the
quantum capacity can be larger than a finite regulariza-
tion of the private information.
The private and locking capacity of a quantum chan-
nel characterize its ability to convey classical information
securely with two different security criteria. We proved
that in order to compute the private capacity it is nec-
essary to consider regularized expressions (5). Similarly,
we expect weak locking information to be superadditive.
5For this to be true with our channel construction a tighter
bound on the accessible information to the environment
would be necessary.
The results shown here raise questions about the prop-
erties that a channel has to verify such that its different
capacities can be computed exactly using only finitely
many (preferably only a few) copies of the channel.
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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 2
We denote by U a von Neumann measurement in the
basis induced by applying unitary U to the computa-
tional basis and by 〈H(U(A)〉U the entropy averaged over
unitaries sampled according to the Haar measure. The
subentropy of a state ρA can be written as:
Q(A) = 〈H(U(A)〉U −Hn log e (A1)
where Hn =
∑n
i=1 1/i [25]. With Eq. A1 we obtain the
following upper bound of the difference between entropy
and subentropy:
H(A)−Q(A) = H(A)− 〈H(U(A)〉U +Hn log e
= 〈H(A)−H(U(A)〉U +Hn log e
≤ Hn log e (A2)
the inequality follows since a measurement either leaves
entropy unchanged (measurement in the eigenbasis of the
state) either increases it.
For degradable channels the optimization of Lu can
be restricted to pure ensembles [18], that is, states of
the form
∑
x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ |φx〉〈φx|. If we restrict the opti-
mization to states ρ of this form the following chain of
inequalities hold:
L(1)u (E⊗np,d ) = maxρ I(X;B)− Iacc(X;E)
= max
ρ
(1− p)I(X;A)− pIacc(X;A)
≤ max
ρ
(1− p)H(A)− pQ(A)
= max
ρ
(1− 2p)H(A) + p(H(A)−Q(A))
≤ (1− 2p) log d+ pHn log e
= (1− p) log d− pγd log e.
6The first inequality follows by bounding the mutual infor-
mation with the entropy of the input and the accessible
information with the subentropy of the input. Suben-
tropy is known to be a lower bound on the accessible
information [25]. The second inequality follows from Eq.
A2.
